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CHOICE OF REGULATORY REGIMES AND 
RELATED ISSUES OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
MURRAY WEIDENBAUM 
 
At the outset, let me state my biases. I do not approach issues of corporate 
governance from the viewpoint of either a lawyer or an accountant. Rather, I 
have been serving as an outside director—an independent outside director—
for a variety of companies, large and small. Invariably, as a green eyeshade 
economist, I am assigned to the audit committee and, on occasion, to chair 
the committee. 
During this thirty-year period, I have developed some attitudes toward 
government regulation, including securities regulation. I have to confess that 
I have not been enamored by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC”) as a bastion of efficient rulemaking. As someone subject to its 
enforcement activities, I have learned to accept the presence of the SEC and 
to meet its bureaucratic requirements. Among economists, this restraint of 
enthusiasm for the SEC is not a minority position. The annual report of the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisers, issued in early February 2003, 
states the matter quite clearly: “[T]he question of whether SEC-enforced 
disclosure rules actually improve the quality of information that investors 
receive remains a subject of debate among researchers almost 70 years after 
the SEC’s creation.”1 
On the positive side, I have been impressed by the variation in the roles of 
state governments in corporate governance. Specifically, I have become an 
admirer of Delaware as a state of incorporation. It has not been a race to the 
bottom, as some describe it. If anything, a race to the top might be more 
accurate. In any event, Delaware has become the preferred venue for 
incorporation for several reasons that are related to the present inquiry. Of 
course, the Delaware justice system is not notoriously anti-business. Rather, 
the law is up-to-date and the judicial system has earned a reputation for 
   Murray Weidenbaum holds the Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professorship at 
Washington University. He has served on a wide variety of corporate and non-profit boards and has 
written on corporate governance from the viewpoint of the outside director. 
 1. Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, U.S. Government Printing 
Office 95-97 (Feb. 2003), available at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2004/pdf/2003_erp.pdf 
(last accessed Aug. 18, 2003). 
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efficiency, fairness, and especially for understanding the world of business. 
We can cite other examples to show the practicality of choice or 
competition in corporate governance, such as the alternatives of state and 
federal chartering of banks. 
To muddy the waters a bit, I also note the voluntary progress that has 
been made. The New York Stock Exchange has led a long series of voluntary 
improvements in corporate governance. Some of the most important have 
related to establishing the audit committee and enhancing its independence. 
The efforts of the Exchange continue to this day.2 
In the voluntary area, many boards of directors have shifted their 
composition from a dominance of insiders to a majority of outsiders. This 
development has occurred in the absence of new law or regulation. 
Turning to more recent events, it became clear before the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley that Enron is a presence in boardrooms just as Andersen is a 
presence in audit committees. Surely no director wants to suffer the disgrace 
of Enron directors, some of whom have been forced off other boards just 
because of their Enron connection. 
In this light, I saw some special charm in applying the approach of 
federalism to the subject of disclosure of financial information. It should not 
be surprising that this economist would viscerally favor a large role for 
competition. In that environment, investors would place a premium on the 
shares of firms operating under the regulatory regime that they prefer. Rather 
than simply relying on my gut feel, I have drawn upon the good work of 
Roberta Romano of the Yale Law School, especially her recent monograph, 
THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES 
REGULATION.3 
However, Merritt Fox’s paper has gotten me to rethink my position. First 
of all, how can any economist object to his proposition that marginal social 
benefits should equal marginal social costs? If I even waver, Princeton will 
revoke my Ph.D. Nevertheless, I find myself raising an uncomfortable 
question: “In an increasingly global financial marketplace, does it really 
make sense for the international investor to face a bewildering variety of 
corporate reporting systems?” I find eminently reasonable Professor Fox’s 
proposal that the proper locus of regulation should be the place where the 
issuer has its “economic center of gravity,” rather than where the securities 
 2.  For details, see Murray Weidenbaum, Governance Leadership: System Failure, System 
Renewal, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Summer 2002, at 25-31. 
 3.  ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES 
REGULATION (2002). 
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are offered or purchased.4 
But, as a chronic temporizer, let me suggest that perhaps a variation of the 
federalism approach might be useful. That is, broad principles might be 
promulgated indicating the types of financial information that should be 
provided. Under these relatively general guidelines, specific regional 
variations could be accommodated. Thus, the appropriate organizations in the 
United States, the European Union (“EU”), Japan, and other major nations 
would adopt the global guidelines. Within this framework, the individual 
member nations of the EU might be permitted to choose specific patterns 
consistent with the guidelines, as would the individual states in this country. 
This entire subject could benefit from a great deal more research and 
analysis. Professor Fox has made a fine attempt to move thinking in a 
positive direction. 
Turning to an economic issue, I have an empirical problem with his 
characterization of the patterns of global economic integration. I would draw 
on a more dynamic analysis. For example, in the last several decades, the 
United States has become a much more open economy. The flow of 
internationally tradable goods and services has been rising substantially faster 
than national output (i.e., gross domestic product). Also, during the course of 
manufacturing many products, such as an automobile, an increasing amount 
of cross-border flows of components occurs. Also, many localities report a 
painful shift of basic production from domestic locations to more cost-
effective Asian sites. Even in the area of services, entrepreneurs are 
overcoming barriers to international labor mobility by moving selected 
business functions to workers overseas. 
In the EU in contrast, the trend is somewhat different. Before the 
establishment of the EU, about 40 percent of the foreign trade of the member 
nations was within what is now the EU. Following the elimination of trade 
barriers within the EU, closer to 80 percent of the international trade of the 
member nations is occurring within the confines of the EU—thus much less 
with other continents. Nevertheless, the typical European economy is still 
measurably more open than that of the United States. In a sense, of course, 
we are the original common market. 
Jonathan Macey’s paper makes a variety of sensible observations about 
the serious shortcomings of corporate governance in the United States.5 I 
 4.  Merritt B. Fox, Optimal Regulatory Areas in Securities Disclosure Regulation, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. (forthcoming Feb. 2003). 
 5.  Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate 
Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329 (2003). 
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would like to focus on the valid point he raises about the lack of 
independence of directors from the management, but offer a more positive 
response. Of course, it is fortunate that Sarbanes-Oxley avoided dealing with 
fundamental questions such as the leadership of American corporations. That 
is a matter for shareholders and boards of directors.  
Let me turn to what I believe is the heart of the matter. It has become 
increasingly evident that the CEO/chairman typically dominates the 
corporate governance process. In about nine out of ten large companies, the 
same individual holds both positions. On the surface, that may sound like an 
efficient way of coordinating board and management activities. Surely, no 
committee (and that is the organizational form of a board) can run an 
organization, at least not effectively. 
Nevertheless, it is very intimidating for an outside director to serve on the 
body that provides the oversight of the management when it is led by the 
most senior member of that management. If I were not in the midst of a 
distinguished group of attorneys, I might describe the prevailing system as an 
inherent conflict of interest. Instead, I merely cite the views of John G. 
Smale, retired CEO of Procter & Gamble and former outside chairman of 
General Motors. Smale notes that as a CEO/chairman he would not have 
welcomed a diminution of his authority. He also reports that he saw his 
outside chairmanship at the time as merely a transitional appointment. 
However, Smale has changed his mind, as shown in his latest writing on the 
topic: 
If the purpose of a board is to represent the shareholders in overseeing 
management’s conduct of the business, such a structure [as an outside 
director serving as chairman] seems considerably more logical than 
having the board chaired by a manager who is also the subject of such 
oversight.6 
This change would go a long way to respond to Professor Macey’s 
serious concern. It would alter the fundamental dynamics of the boardroom. I 
suggest that the proper time to consider such a shift is when a new CEO is 
being selected, surely not during the incumbency of someone who presently 
holds both positions.  
A more modest proposal involves a similar recognition of the 
uncomfortable lack of independence with regard to the internal audit. 
Typically, this function reports to the chief financial officer or to a 
subordinate. In my experience, it is desirable to shift the reporting 
 6.  John G. Smale, Where Was the Board? ACROSS THE BOARD, May/June 2002, at 11-12. 
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relationship to another knowledgeable member of the senior management, 
such as the chief legal counsel or the chief operating officer. The 
independence of the internal audit is also enhanced by a good working 
relationship with the audit committee. This is another way of strengthening 
the position of the outside directors. 
A final thought: there is a broad range in the scope and severity of 
government regulation of business in the United States. At one extreme, we 
find controls over entry, exit, price, and profits, as typified by public utility 
commissions. An intermediate position is held by agencies in the area of 
safety and the environment. These agencies regulate the ways that companies 
conduct their activities. At the other end is located regulation with the lightest 
touch—the requirement for the provision of information. With proper 
recognition of the costs imposed, this is the mildest form of governmental 
intervention in business decision-making. There is a useful lesson here from 
the checkered history of regulation. Success at this mild stage of regulation 
can obviate the need and surely reduce the pressure for more intrusive forms 
of government intervention.7 That underscores the substantive importance of 
this Symposium, whose endeavor it is to improve the information that 
business provides to the government and thus to the public. 
 
 
 7.  For elaboration of this point, see Murray Weidenbaum, Restoring Public Confidence in 
American Business, THE WASHINGTON Q., Winter 2002-03, at 53-62. 
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